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Abstract: Allowing resource users to communicate in behavioural experiments 
on commons dilemmas increases the level of cooperation. In actual common 
pool resource dilemmas in the real world, communication is costly, which is 
an important detail missing from most typical experiments. We conducted 
experiments where participants must give up harvesting opportunities to 
communicate. The constrained communication treatment is compared with the 
effect of limited information about the state of the resource and the actions of 
the other participants. We find that despite making communication costly, 
performance of groups improves in all treatments with communication. We also 
find that constraining communication has a more significant effect than limiting 
information on the performance of groups.
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1. Introduction
Today we possess an increased understanding of how communities can 
successfully self-govern their common resources. Lessons have been learned 
from comparative analysis of case studies, and some mechanisms which stimulate 
self-governance can be replicated in controlled experiments (Poteete et al. 2010). 
Laboratory experiments have shown the importance of communication and 
sanctions (Ostrom et al. 1994; Brosig et al. 2003; Bochet et al. 2006; Balliet 2010; 
Janssen et al. 2010). Conventional economic theory would have predicted that 
“cheap talk” (communication without the ability to enforce promises) and costly 
sanctioning (paying to reduce the earnings of others) would not have an effect. 
However, they have a significant effect, and this effect has been replicated in 
various social dilemma settings in the lab and the field (Chaudhuri 2011).
The increase of group performance due to communication has various 
explanations which are not mutually inclusive such as (1) formation of group 
identity, (2) better understanding of experimental environment and strategy, (3) 
better discernment of other players’ type (i.e., whether others are cooperative or 
not), (4) voicing of mutual commitments, and (5) creation and reinforcement of 
norms (Ostrom 1997; Shankar and Pavitt 2002; Poteete et al. 2010).
The experiments we performed are inspired by observations from case studies of 
common pool resources (Poteete et al. 2010). One of the challenges in creating rules 
that are effective in governing common resources over the long period is to create 
rules that are easy to follow and easy to determine whether other resource users are 
also following them or not. When the costs of monitoring actions of others and the 
state of the resource are kept low, resource users can gain a sense of confidence in 
rule compliance without having to invest substantial time and effort in monitoring. 
When natural resources are large there can be substantial problems in monitoring. 
When fishers harvest fish from a large territory, there is no way that they can see what 
everyone else is currently doing. Many resource management systems developed 
by local resource users allocate space and time in such a way that authorized 
appropriators have some assurance that rules are being followed by others. 
For example, in the Maine lobster fishery rules evolved to allocate permanent 
spots within a bay to specific fishers (Acheson 2003; Wilson et al. 2007). The map 
of those spots is common knowledge among the local resource users. If you find 
a pot of somebody else in your territory, this gives you the authority to challenge 
the owner of the pot. In irrigation systems a governance solution is to allocate 
certain time blocks to open their gates in a specific order (Tang 1992; Meinzen-
Dick 2007). Not getting water at the specified times will mean that somebody 
else is collecting more water than defined, and more targeted monitoring and 
enforcement efforts might be implemented. Time is also used in some Alpine 
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commons to define when an agreed-upon number of trees can be cut (Netting 
1981; Stevenson 1990). After cutting the trees they are allocated into approximate 
equal stacks and randomly assigned to eligible households. Since trees cannot be 
harvested at any other date, enforcing those rules is easy since anyone who cuts at 
another time is breaking the rule.
In line with these observations, experiments reported in Janssen (2013) show 
that limiting the information to the resource users reduces the effectiveness of 
communication. An explanation is the large proportion of conditional co-operators 
in experimental studies (e.g. Fischbacher et al. 2001; Kocher et al. 2008; Rustagi 
et al. 2010). Reducing information that helps participants to estimate the level of 
cooperation by others, may affect the level of cooperation (Janssen 2013).
Experiments typically assume that communication occurs during a designated 
communication period without any cost to the participants, but in practice 
communication is not free. Attending meetings costs time and energy and can 
reduce the overall productivity of the resource user. For example, Brzezinski et al. 
(2010) analysed attendance of fishers in council meetings. The greater the distance 
that fishers had to travel the less frequently they participated. If communication 
is not free and participants have to decide to engage in communication or 
additional resource extraction, it is not clear whether participants will spend effort 
in communication. If they will do, this may indicate they anticipate gains from 
“cheap talk”, which is defined as communication without the ability to enforce 
promises. 
In our experiments we tested the consequences of costly communication by 
allowing communication and harvesting of the resource at the same time. The 
costs of communication might not be the same for everyone in our experimental 
environment since it depends on the speed in which participants type in their 
messages and cannot harvest resources. Participants have to make a trade-off 
between the benefits of communication and the benefits of collecting resources.
In this paper we will report a series of experiments with groups of resource users 
who experience different degrees of difficulty in communication and who derive 
information based on the actions of others. Note that our analysis makes use of data 
from earlier experiments on limiting vision of resource users (Janssen 2013), plus 
new data from experiments in which we included constrained communication. 
This allows us to test the effect of both limited information as well as constrained 
communication and their interactions. We will test whether communication still 
leads to improved performance if communication is constrained and information 
is limited. This may provide us insights into the role(s) of communication.
In applying the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework 
(Ostrom 2005) we changed the biophysical context and explored the consequences 
on the outcomes in the action arena. The biophysical context here affects the costs 
and availability of information. The biophysical context is the implementation 
how visible actions of others are, and whether participants can communicate and 
harvest resources at the same time. We found that communication still improves 
group performance even with increased difficulties in communication and limited 
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information about the resource, but the level of benefit for having communication 
is reduced.
The next section will describe in more detail the experimental design and 
specific hypotheses we are testing. We will then present the results of the 
experiments. The paper closes with a discussion of the results and the insights we 
derived on the role of information and communication on governing the commons.
2. Experimental design
Our experiments are focused on understanding the effect of limited 
information and constrained communication on collective action in a social-
ecological system. We developed our experiments within a real-time dynamic 
resource harvesting setting (Janssen et al. 2008, 2010). The software used 
for this experiment is open-source and available at https://bitbucket.org/
virtualcommons/foraging/. The protocol of the experiments is available in the 
online appendix.
Participants in our experiments appropriate renewable tokens from a shared 
renewable resource environment. Each group is made up of five participants who 
share a 29×29 grid of cells. In the initial state, 25% of the grid space is filled 
with tokens, thus 210 tokens. The avatars are initially placed in the middle row 
of the screen with equidistant spacing between them. In order to collect a token a 
participant must position their avatar on the location of that token and explicitly 
press the space bar. Each token harvested is worth $0.02 USD. There are two 
treatments for the way information is presented on the screen (Figure 1). In the 
first situation, participants have complete information on the spatial position of 
tokens and can watch the harvesting actions of other group members in real 
time. Participants can see the total harvested tokens of all participants at the top 
of the screen. In the second case only the tokens and avatars within a radius of 
six cells can be seen. The environment outside their vision radius is depicted 
black. Furthermore, participants can only see the number of harvested tokens for 
another participant when that participant’s avatar is visible and within their field 
of vision.
Every second empty cells have the potential to generate new tokens. The 
probability that a given empty cell will generate a token is density-dependent 
on the number of adjacent cells with tokens. The probability p
t
 is linearly related 
to the number of neighbours: p
t
=λ*n
t
/N where n
t
 is the number of neighbouring 
cells containing a green token, N is the number of neighbouring cells (N=8), 
and (λ=0.01). If an empty cell is completely surrounded by eight tokens, it will 
generate a token at a higher probability than an empty cell that abuts only three 
tokens. At least one adjacent cell must contain a token for a new token generation 
to occur. Therefore, if participants appropriate all of the tokens on the screen, they 
have exhausted the resource and no additional token generation will occur. By 
designing the environment in this manner, we capture a key characteristic of many 
spatially dependent renewable resources. The optimum level of appropriation 
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depends on the initial starting conditions, and probabilistic renewal of the empty 
cells. Janssen et al. (2010) estimated the optimal group level harvesting amount 
to be 665 tokens by the end of the session. The participants get the qualitative 
description of the resource dynamics and have four minutes of practice with the 
experiment before the experiment starts.
We had previously implemented communication as a discrete round, four 
minutes of free chat between group members via a chat box. We changed this 
so that communication would be available during the harvesting period while 
the participants were sharing the common resource. A chat box was placed 
on the screen next to the resource environment so that participants could only 
communicate if they stopped harvesting for a moment. When limited information 
(radius of six cells) was combined with constrained communication, participants 
could only chat with those visible on the screen.
Earlier studies showed that groups always overharvest the resource the first time 
they share the resource, and that allowing communication in subsequent rounds 
increases performance significantly (Janssen 2010; Janssen et al. 2010). In those 
experiments, as in the ones reported here, participants are informed on the number 
of periods in the experiments as well as the length of each period. When participants 
cooperated, the harvesting levels during the first few minutes of the experiment 
are lower compared to the case of rapid overharvesting. Since the duration of the 
period is known, and a clock shows the amount of time left, the participants harvest 
levels increase in the last minute of the period to collect all the tokens. Analysis 
of chat data did not reveal insights into specific message content leading to better 
Figure 1: Screenshot of the experimental environment where participants can harvest. The 
green diamond shaped tokens are the resource units. The yellow avatar is the active participant; 
the blue avatars are the other group members. On the left is the full vision environment and on 
the right is the limited vision environment.
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performance although more equal participation of all group members did lead to 
better performance (Janssen 2010). In this paper we will distinguish four different 
environmental conditions that vary the amount of information visible and whether 
chat is happening before or during the harvesting period (Table 1).
In this study we want to test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. The increase of earnings in rounds of the communication is reduced 
if communication is costly.
Communication has been demonstrated to increase earnings in common pool 
experiments due to a reduction of the harvesting efforts (Ostrom et al. 1994; 
Janssen et al. 2010). In those experiments participants could chat online or face-
to-face for a limited amount of time freely without any competing activity. If 
communication is not free, but is a competing activity to resource appropriation, 
a different outcome can be expected. In line with the principles of economics, 
participants have to make a trade-off between harvesting and communication. 
Participants may communicate less or not at all in order not to forgo harvesting 
opportunities. As such we may expect less communication and a smaller effect of 
communication rounds. 
Hypothesis 2. Allowing participants to communicate will still increase performance 
of groups compared to no communication periods, in all four conditions.
If communication is possible but difficult all five possible mechanisms as 
discussed in the introduction are still possible and thus we may see an increase 
of performance. Since participants are expected to be more strategic with 
Table 1: The four different experimental conditions that affect information observed and 
exchanged.
General 
description
 Participants have a separate four 
minute period in which they write 
and read each other messages.
 Participants are allowed to send messages 
only during the harvesting period, and when 
reading and writing it reduce attention from 
harvesting activities.
 Unconstrained chat  Constrained chat
Full vision  Four-minute chat before 
harvesting period. In the 
harvesting period participants 
have full information about the 
actions of all other participants.
 Writing and reading messages occurs only 
during harvesting period. During harvesting 
period everyone can see chat messages, and 
everyone has full information of the actions 
of all other participants.
Limited vision  Four minute chat before 
harvesting period. In the 
harvesting period participants can 
only see resources and avatars 
within a radius of six cells.
 Writing and reading messages occurs only 
during harvesting period. Participants can 
only receive messages of senders who are 
within a radius of 6 cells at the time the 
message is sent. Participants can only see 
resources avatars within a radius of six cells.
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communication, the content of the communication may also reveal which kind of 
information is more important to the participants. 
Hypothesis 3. The level of cooperation significantly drops when communication is 
not possible anymore after a series of communication periods.
If communication is not possible anymore after various periods of 
communication we typically see cooperation remains at the same level 
(Janssen et al. 2010). In the introduction we listed five possible explanations 
of the effect of communication. These explanations have a different effect 
on the outcomes of stopping with communication. If formation of group 
identity and a better understanding of the experiment were the only factors 
explaining the benefit of communication (and therefore the other three factors 
are irrelevant), we would not expect to see a change in the cooperation level. 
But other explanations like getting better discernment of other players’ type, 
voicing mutual commitments and creation and reinforcement of norms are 
critical factors, lead us to expect a significant drop when communication is 
stopped. When participants cannot reinforce norms and expectations, this 
reduces the cooperative behaviour.
We tested eight treatments in an AB-BA, AC-CA, format in which each 
treatment consists of three periods of no communication and three periods 
where text chat communication is allowed (Table 2). We tested the effect of 
communication for two different orders. If communication happens in the last 
three periods group identity and improved understanding could explain the 
increase of performance. But if group identity and improved understanding are 
key factors due to communication, this will predict that there would be no decline 
of performance if communication is not allowed anymore if we start with the 
periods of communication.
Table 2: Experimental design. The name refers to the specifications of the experiment. For 
example, NC-C-LV is an experiment where participants could not chat during first 3 periods, 
but could chat for a few minutes before each harvesting period in the last 3 periods. The vision 
on the resources is limited to a radius of 5 cells.
Name  Number of groups 
(individuals)
Vision  Periods 1–3  Periods 4–6
NC-C-LV  6 (30)  Radius  No chat (NC)  Chat (C)
C-NC-LV  7 (35)  Radius  Chat (C)  No chat (NC)
NC-C-FV  5 (25)  Full  No chat (NC)  Chat (C)
C-NC-FV  4 (20)  Full  Chat (C)  No chat (NC)
NC-CC-LV  5 (25)  Radius  No chat (NC)  Constrained Chat (CC)
CC-NC-LV  5 (25)  Radius  Constrained chat (CC)  No chat (NC)
NC-CC-FV  7 (35)  Full  No chat (NC)  Constrained Chat (CC)
CC-NC-FV  5 (25)  Full  Constrained Chat (CC)  No chat (NC)
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3. Experimental results
3.1. General statistical results
We report results from two separate series of experiments. The experiments were 
performed in an experimental laboratory at Arizona State University (ASU) on the 
Tempe campus. All participants were undergraduate students at ASU who were 
recruited by sending out invitations to a random sample from a database of more of 
1500 potential participants. The average participant’s age was 19 years old and their 
average earnings were 17 dollars (including a 5 dollars show-up compensation) for 
a one-hour experiment. The first four treatments were conducted during the 2010 
spring semester, while the second batch of four treatments was conducted during 
the 2012 spring semester. Participants of the first set of experiments could not be 
invited for the second set of experiments. Participants could familiarize themselves 
with the experimental environment during a four minute individual round using a 
size of the environment equal to 20% of the group experiment. At the time of the 
individual round participants did not know the real experiment would be a group 
experiment. A detailed analysis of the first four treatments, which focused on the 
role of information, is reported in Janssen (2013). In this paper we focus on the role 
of communication in both sets of experiments. 
To illustrate the dynamics of the experiment we present the average amount 
of tokens in the resource for the five groups in treatment NC-C-FV (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Resource availability at given times (seconds). The figure shows the average 
remaining level of the resource for the groups of 5 participants exposed to treatment NC-C-FV 
for the 6 periods during the experiment (numbers 1–6 in the figure refer to the periods). The 
treatment is a combination of two sets of three periods of a specific condition. Participants can 
see the whole screen (Figure 1, left) and cannot communicate during the first 3 periods. In the 
last three periods communication is allowed for four minutes before each period of harvesting.
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Participants know the length of the period and the seconds left during a period 
were displayed at the top of the screen. Participants can earn more as a group 
if they do not harvest quickly at the beginning, allowing the resource to grow. 
We see that in period 1 the group depletes the resource within 150 seconds. 
In subsequent periods the resource is depleted more rapidly. In the last 3 
periods participants can communicate for four minutes before each harvesting 
period. The resource is depleted more slowly after communication, and over 
the periods groups learn to first let the resource grow before they deplete it 
entirely. This led to an increase in the group earnings from 264 tokens in 
period 3 to 520 tokens in period 6. If we compare the first three periods we 
have an average of 271 tokens while the last three periods have an average of 
480 tokens.
When communication is allowed the resource level stays at a higher level 
during the four minute period. Figure 3 shows that allowing groups to communicate 
leads to higher levels of tokens collected. Communication increases earnings 
significantly when we use the Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks test for the 
average of 3 periods with and without the possibility of communication of all four 
treatment groups (p<0.001). Figure 3 shows that the groups with unconstrained 
communication have a significantly bigger increase in earnings than those with 
constrained communication. Using the Mann-Whitney test on the relative increase 
of earnings after communication we find a significance of p<0.01 for FV-C 
compared to FV-CC and LV-CC, and p<0.02 for LV-C compared to FV-CC and 
LV-CC. No significant effects are found between FV and LV with the same type 
of communication. This result indicates that costly communication leads to an 
improvement of performance but significantly less than communication without 
constraints. 
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Figure 3: The average harvested tokens of the first three periods and the last three periods 
when groups do not communicate in the first three periods, but can communicate in the last 
three periods.
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Groups that started with communication and then had three rounds without 
communication incurred a significant reduction of earnings using a Wilcoxon 
Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks test (p<0.001) (Figure 4). There are no significant 
effects of decrease of performance between the four different treatments.
When participants were placed in an environment with full vision and had 
unconstrained communication in periods 1–3 (C-NC-FV), they earned a higher 
number of tokens compared to the situation where the group had no communication 
in periods 1–3 (NC-C-FV) (p<0.05 Mann-Whitney test). All other settings with 
or without communication, constrained or not, with limited vision or full vision, 
do not experience significant differences if this configuration happens in the first 
three or last three periods.
In Table 3 the results of a multilevel mixed-effect linear regression are 
presented where the dependent variable is the group level harvest of tokens. The 
analysis included the following variables:
 – Limited vision (1 for groups if from treatment with limited vision; 
0 otherwise)
 – Unconstrained communication (full vision) (1 for groups who can 
communicate and with full vision, C-FV situation from Table 2; 0 
otherwise)
 – Unconstrained communication (limited vision) (1 for groups who can 
communicate and with limited vision, C-LV situation from Table 2; 
0 otherwise)
 – Constrained communication (full vision) (1 for groups who can 
communicate and with full vision, CC-FV situation from Table 2; 
0 otherwise)
 – Constrained communcation (limited vision) (1 for groups who can 
communicate and with limited vision, CC-LV situation from Table 2; 
0 otherwise)
 – Had unconstrained communication (full vision) (1 for groups in periods 
4 to 6 who experienced the C-FV situation in periods 1–3; 0 otherwise).
 – Had unconstrained communication (limited vision) (1 for groups in 
periods 4 to 6 who experienced the C-LV situation in periods 1–3; 0 
otherwise).
 – Had constrained communication (full vision) (1 for groups in periods 4 
to 6 who experienced the CC-FV situation in periods 1–3; 0 otherwise).
 – Had constrained communication (limited vision) (1 for groups in periods 
4 to 6 who experienced the CC-LV situation in periods 1–3; 0 otherwise).
 – Had no communication (1 for groups in periods 1–3 when communication 
is not allowed; 0 otherwise).
 – Learning (communication) (1 for first period when communication is 
allowed, 2 for second, and 3 for third; 0 otherwise).
 – Learning (no communication) (1 for first period when communication is 
not allowed, 2 for second, and 3 for third; 0 otherwise).
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The effects of the treatments are compared to the situation of no communication 
with full vision during the first three periods. This is the default setting. 
Unconstrained communication and full vision have a strong significant effect. 
Periods with unconstrained communication and full vision have 84 more tokens 
on average than the default situation. When a group was allowed in periods 1–3 
to have unconstrained communication with full vision the harvest is 129 tokens 
higher in periods 4–6 when communication is not allowed anymore compared to 
the default situation. Another significant effect was in the periods where groups 
experienced constrained communication with full vision. Note that we did not 
find any significant effects of limited vision.
When we look at learning effects, we find a significant reduction of earnings 
in the no communication periods. Every period without communication leads to 
an average reduction of 21 tokens. Communication has a positive effect over the 
periods as each period with communication corresponds with an increase of 22 
tokens. 
When participants have unconstrained chat they send an average of 45 
messages per group per period if they chat in periods 1, 2 and 3 (Figure 5A). If 
groups first experience three no communication periods, they exchange more chat 
messages, 54 messages per group per period, a significant increase (p<0.1 using a 
Mann-Whitney test on the cumulated number of chat messages per group). When 
participants are constrained in their communication, there is a dramatic reduction 
of chat messages (Figure 5B). On average there are 7.5 messages in the first three 
periods and 11 messages in the last three periods. This is a significant higher level 
of communication when this happened in the last three periods (p<0.05 using a 
Mann-Whitney test).
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Figure 4: The average harvested tokens of the first three periods and the last three periods 
when groups can communicate in the first three periods, but cannot communicate in the last 
three periods.
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What can be said on who is sending chat messages and what is the impact on 
their earnings? We do not find any statistical significant effect (using 2-tailed Mann- 
Whitney tests) between participants who send messages during the experiment 
when still tokens are on the screen, and those who do not send messages. Note that 
we don’t include the situation when participants are chatting when no resources 
are left as this does not include a social dilemma situation. Hence we have no 
evidence that those who communicated gave up a significant level of earnings 
relative to those who did not communicate. 
What can explain the higher volume of chat messages in periods 4–6 compared 
to periods 1–3? Participants that have experienced resource collapse three periods in a 
row understand what it means to be trapped in a tragedy of the commons and are eager 
to chat when they get the opportunity. When they have the ability to communicate at 
the start of the experiment, they may have less motivation to do so. However, this 
lower volume of chat messages still leads to a significant increase in earnings. 
The chat data shows that there is a significant reduction in the communication 
volume when communication is constrained. The smaller increase in group 
performance with constrained communication confirms hypothesis 1.
We investigated the content of the chat by coding each period (Tables 4 
and 5). We evaluated each period to determine whether there was coordination 
Table 3: A multilevel mixed-effects linear regression is performed with the gross number of 
tokens that groups collected for each period. The independent variables are dummies indicating 
the treatment differences: unconstrained communication or not, full or limited vision, past 
experiences with communication, and learning (periods 1, 2 and 3 will have dummies 1, 2 and 
3, same for periods 4, 5 and 6). If we mentioned a dummy like “had X” we mean a dummy 
with value 1 in periods 4–6 if X happened in periods 1–3. The values between parentheses are 
standard deviations. 
Harvest
Constant 353.548*** (19.217)
Limited vision 13.900 (21.439)
Unconstrained communication (full vision) 84.218*** (26.864)
Unconstrained communication (limited vision) 22.80 (25.900)
Constrained communication (full vision) –6.630 (25.942)
Constrained communication (limited vision) –42.184 (26.788)
Had unconstrained communication (full vision) 129.462*** (27.226)
Had unconstrained communication (limited vision) 24.675 (24.085)
Had constrained communication (full vision) 43.161* (25.373)
Had constrained communication (limited vision) 8.160 (26.157)
Had no communication 21.075 (18.796)
Learning (communication) 22.568*** (4.927)
Learning (no communication) –20.670*** (4.927)
N 264
Log Likelihood 1436.797
Wald χ2 364.55 (p<0.001)
χ2 120.69 (p<0.001)
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001.
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within the group (when, where and how to harvest), a commitment or 
confirmation (“yes, we need to split the resource in equal parts,” a normative 
statement (“everybody should wait the first minute”), statements that create 
a group identity (“if we work together we all will win”), or statements that 
explain the experiment (“if you eat a single token, it will not grow back”). We 
only did this classification for constrained communication, since in groups with 
unconstrained communication all types of comments were used since they could 
chat for three times four minutes and all classifications were found in almost all 
the groups. Hence our classification was not meaningful for the unconstrained 
communication experiment. Each type of comment was made by about half the 
groups (who could communicate with constraints). We could not find a pattern 
in the data that could explain why some groups increase their performance more 
than others. If we look at the number of chat messages we also do not see a 
pattern.
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Figure 5: (A) The average number of chat messages in experiments in treatments with 
unconstrained communication. (B) The average number of chat messages in experiments in 
treatments with constrained communication.
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So, why is it that the number of chat messages and the type of comments 
do not fully explain the outcomes? If participants are conditional cooperators 
and intend to cooperate, not much communication is needed to coordinate 
their actions. However, if participants have different goals or expectations, 
communication may facilitate agreements among group participants, or enflame 
disagreements between participants. Hence the type of communication depends 
on the composition of the group. Differences in personalities will lead to different 
intentions and actions and different effects of the communication. 
Just the fact that participants can communicate leads to a better performance 
and how communication is used depends on the context of the group. Will they use 
it to explain the instructions of the experiment, when some participants have some 
difficulty with the instructions? Will the group initially not communicate but at the 
end of the period when the resource is depleted start chatting on how to improve 
the performance? Will group members voice their intentions (“SHARE”) etc.?
To illustrate the complexity of quantifying the communication patterns we 
provide below all 14 messages in the best performing group of Table 5 where the 
average harvest goes from 325 in period 1–3 to 524 in periods 4–6. The number in 
parentheses refers to the number of seconds into the period in which the message 
was posted. We have not recorded the time participants took to type in messages. 
We see that in the beginning of period 4 three of the five participants voice 
statements to cooperate, and confirmation to do so (“yeah sharing is awesome!”) 
and create a group identity (“if we wait we can all get more”). In period 5 we see 
this reinforced with some normative statement (“we should share more”). Note 
that the participants are not very specific about how they will cooperate, nor do 
Table 4: Analysis of chat data for experiments that experienced constrained communication in 
periods 1–3. The order of the rows is based on the harvesting level during the first 3 periods. 
The first two columns represent the average harvest per period for the first three periods (P1-
3) or last 3 periods (P4-6). The third column represents column 2 divided by column 1. The 
fourth column indicates whether the participants had full vision (FV) or limited vision (LV). The 
fifth column depicts the number of chat messages over 3 periods. The last 4 columns indicates 
whether in the content of the communication participants explain the game, commit to certain 
actions, establish norms or try to create a group feeling.
P1-3  P4-6  Change Vision #chat  Coordination  Explain Commit  Norm Group
352  270  –23%  LV  9  X  X   X  X
427  335  –22%  LV  8  X     
361  283  –21%  FV  22  X  X  X  X  X
304  268  –12%  FV  0      
470  415  –12%  FV  14  X  X  X  X  
411  367  –11%  LV  45  X   X   
402  363  –10%  LV  3      
528  498  –6%  FV  90  X  X  X  X  X
440  431  –2%  FV  21  X   X   
391  444  +14%  LV  3  X  X    
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they make explicit statements. The fact that the majority of the group signals 
cooperative behaviour (and give up harvesting to write this message) may make 
these statements convincing.
•	 Period 4:
•	 Player 3: WAIT!!!!!!! (4)
•	 Player 4: please share crop (7)
•	 Player 4: everyone stop (12)
•	 Player 4: ok only take when there are others (23)
•	 Player 4: if we wait we can all get more (31)
•	 Player 1: yeah sharing is awesome! (32)
•	 Player 1: just give them time to come back (40)
•	 Period 5:
•	 Player 1: share! (4)
•	 Player 3: SHARE! (5)
•	 Player 5: wait for them to regenerate (6)
•	 Player 4: we should share more money take them all in the last 30 (14)
•	 Player 2: yessir/ma/am lol (16)
•	 Period 6:
•	 Player 3: same plan (2)
•	 Player 2: let tem regernerate!!!!! (39)
Table 5: Analysis of chat data for experiments that experienced constrained communication in 
periods 4–6. The order of the rows is based on the harvested tokens during the last 3 periods. 
The first two columns represent the average harvest per period for the first three periods (P1-
3) or last 3 periods (P4-6). The third column represents column 2 divided by column 1. The 
fourth column indicates whether the participants had full vision (FV) or limited vision (LV). The 
fifth column depicts the number of chat messages over 3 periods. The last 4 columns indicate 
whether in the content of the communication participants explain the game, commit to certain 
actions, establish norms or try to create a group feeling.
P1-3  P4-6  Change Vision #chat  Coordination  Explain Commit  Norm Group
326  341  +4%  FV  31  X  X  X   
338  356  +6%  LV  45  X   X  X  X
301  328  +9%  LV  55  X  X  X  X  X
291  321  +10%  FV  52  X  X  X   X
383  428  +12%  FV  20  X    X  X
422  481  +14%  FV  33  X  X  X  X  X
322  370  +15%  LV  34  X  X    X
397  475  +20%  LV  23  X   X  X  X
305  411  +34%  LV  25  X   X   
350  485  +39%  FV  28  X   X  X  
319  451  +41  FV  22  X  X  X   
325  524  +61%  FV  14  X   X  X  X
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Tables 4 and 5 provide an overview of the communication quantity and 
content of each group, and are ordered in the relative change between periods 
with and without communication. When groups start with communication we see 
coordination in almost all groups and less of the other four roles of communication. 
The group with the lowest performance does not chat at all, while the group with 
the highest performance has the highest number of chat messages. Both are in the 
full vision treatment, and this illustrates that vision on average does not have an 
impact. However, full vision seems to be more polarizing in the outcomes. The 
groups with low vision all have similar performance independent of the content 
and amount of communication. Groups with the lowest performance in periods 
1–3 also have the largest decline in performance when communication is no 
longer possible.
Groups that start with three periods without communication all chat when 
communication is enabled and coordinate. They also make commitments 
frequently. Groups with low performance in the periods with communication 
often spend their communication time explaining the experiment. The lowest 
performing groups with constrained communication have many chat messages, 
as they also have more time to chat after they have depleted the resource during 
the period. We see in best performing groups a combination of commitment 
and norm sharing. Normative statements are less frequent in low performing 
groups.
The individual group results lead to some qualitative insights but it is important 
to realize the complexities of the communication analysis. Individuals can make 
normative statements but this norm might not be adopted or understood by others. 
Individuals can explain the experiments to others, but this might not help the 
understanding of others. Hence, we only measure the information exchange and 
observe the behaviour. We cannot determine how the information is processed. 
Nevertheless, the qualitative analysis shows that there is a combination of factors 
playing a role in the effectiveness of communication. In high performing groups, 
there is frequently a combination of normative statements and expressions 
of commitment. This suggests that reinforcement of normative behaviour is 
important in the effectiveness of communication.
4. Discussion
One of the persistent findings of behavioural economics on social dilemmas is 
the high frequency of conditional cooperation observed in experiments (e.g. 
Fischbacher et al. 2001; Kocher et al. 2008; Rustagi et al. 2010). If cooperation is 
conditional, we should expect that cooperation varies with the ability to receive 
the information necessary to determine whether the conditions for cooperation 
have been met. If information becomes more difficult to derive, this may affect 
the expectations participants have about others.
In this paper we presented the results of a series of experiments where we 
manipulated the information available to resource users and the constraints 
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in communication among the group members. We find that constraining 
communication has more effect on the harvesting levels in comparison to limiting 
the information derived from observation. Combining both limited vision and 
constrained communication has the worst performance, while full vision and 
unconstrained communication has the best performance.
Can we explain the major effect of constrained communication? First, 
the amount of chat messages is dramatically lower when communication is 
constrained. Just the reduction of the volume of information might explain the 
lower performance. Additional analysis on the content of the chat messages suggest 
that all groups do coordinate their actions, but high performing groups typically 
combine normative statements and confirmative statements. The positive effect of 
communication on cooperation seems not to be explained by communication as 
ways to explanation the experiment or develop a group identity.
Our analysis confirms that communication increases group performance 
in commons dilemmas, even if communication is costly. Being able to express 
normative statements and commitments might be effective if the group consists 
of conditional cooperators. Participants that are willing to sacrifice harvesting 
opportunities to express their commitments are sending costly signals for 
cooperation. A lack of communication may indicate that others are not willing 
to give up harvesting to communicate and provides some information on the 
behavioural types of the other actors.
Although the experiments were performed in highly controlled and abstract 
settings with financial rewards, they provide some insights in the conditions 
for self-governance of the commons (Ostrom 1990). The results illustrate the 
importance of information due to direct observation and/or communication. The 
harder it is to obtain information, the more difficult it is to derive cooperative 
outcomes. The biophysical context can limit the information, but rules can be 
developed to overcome some of those biophysical constraints. 
We also derived some better understanding on why communication is effective 
in stimulating cooperation. Our experimental results raise the hypothesis that 
communication may have a positive effect on cooperation due to its ability to 
derive information on the motivations of other participants, which should be tested 
in future studies. There might be various ways to do this, including making specific 
plans, voicing commitments, or giving up resources to communicate. Conditional 
cooperators are likely affected by communication (affecting expectations), while 
pure altruists and egoists will by definition not be affected by communication. 
Future research may focus on whether and how motivations and expectations of 
participants are affected by communication.
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